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DECISION ANALYSIS OF THE VOYAGER MARS PROJECT*
Lee E. Hargrave, Jr.
Missile and Space Division
General Electric Company
Valley Forge, Pennsylvania
Abstract
This report summarizes the application of decision 
analysis to the selection of Voyager mission configura­ 
tions for the Mars opportunities in the 1970 T s. In this 
context, the term nmission configuration" connotes the 
number and types of launch vehicles, spacecraft, and 
capsule systems to be launched at each Mars launch 
opportunity. This marks the first known application of 
the discipline of decision analysis to a space project.
Some 14 potential mission configurations are proposed 
for Mars missions from 1971 through 1981, ranging from 
a fly-by with a small, nonsurvivable atmospheric probe 
to orbiting spacecraft and large surface landers with 
extensive experiment capability. The goal of the decision 
analysis process is to select (1) the optimal configuration 
for the initial mission and (2) a project strategy for 
selecting mission configurations at subsequent oppor­ 
tunities. The first step toward this goal is to define 
some 56 possible outcomes of the Voyager Mars Project, 
consisting of all combinations of four outcomes from the 
orbiting spacecraft and 14 outcomes from the capsule 
system.
The heart of decision analysis is the decision tree, 
which contains two types of nodes and two types of 
branches. Emanating from decision nodes are alternative 
branches, each branch representing one of the configura­ 
tions available for selection at that point in the project. 
Chance nodes are followed by outcome branches, one 
branch for each outcome that may be achieved at that 
point in the project. Probabilities of occurrence and 
values are assigned to each outcome. Costs are assigned 
to each decision alternative.
To generate the probabilities of the 14 potential mission 
configurations achieving all combinations of the four 
orbiter outcomes and 14 capsule outcomes during any 
year of opportunity and from any current level of project 
achievement, a comprehensive probability model is 
developed.
The method for determining the cost of each alternative 
involves estimating a baseline cost for each potential 
mission configuration and then modifying it as a function 
of the year of opportunity and prior mission configuration 
development history.
A value model is developed to provide a medium for 
encoding the value preferences of the decision maker and
* This work was performed by the General 
Electric Company as a correlative effort to a 
task which was assigned and funded by the 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute 
of Technology, sponsored by the National Aero­ 
nautics and Space Administration under Contract 
NAS7-1000
converting these preferences into value assignments for
orbiter and capsule outcomes.
The full decision model and the three submodels for 
probabilities, values, and costs are programmed within
the framework of a versatile program system* 'The
program system is exercised with nominal value, cost,, 
and probability data; and a ranking of optimal project 
strategies, or policies, versus expected, project cost is 
obtained.
The nominal project strategies are then, analyzed with 
respect to their sensitivity to input data* Critical input 
parameters which are 'varied include 'values, probabilities, 
time discount factors on both costs and valu.es, confidence 
in our knowledge of the Mars atmospheric and surface 
environment, the risk aversion characteristics of the 
decision maker, and launch vehicle reliability and 
redundancy.
Conclusions are drawn regarding those features which a 
Voyager Mars Project policy should, contain. It is 
emphasized, however, that these conclusions are the 
result of a study, and in no- way constitute a. final decision. 
by JPL, NASA, or any other government agency regard­ 
ing the Voyager Project,,, The principal product of this 
effort, is the development of a logical procedure for 
selecting Voyager mission, configurations which reflects 
technical feasibility, NASA project objectives, and the 
economic environment of ttie project and which is 
dynamically adaptive' to project history.
Introduction
This paper describes the development and exercising of a 
new technique for the selection of Voyager 'Mans mission 
configurations. In this context, the term "mission con­ 
figuration" connotes the number and types of launch 
vehicles,, spacecraft, and capsule systems to be launched 
at a given Mars launch opportunity. Of principal interest 
is. the optimal configuration for the first Voyager Mars 
mission, in 1973. This selection cannot be made without 
considering the probable subsequent evolution of con­ 
figurations through 'the last Voyager Mars mission in 
1979. In, other words, selection of the initial mission 
configuration must be made within the framework of a 
project strategy for the progression of mission conf^ira- 
tions. Hence, selection off the project strategy (or 
policy) is the sine _<ma_non»
This activity marks the first known application of the 
discipline of "decision analysis" to a space project. 
Still in the formative stage, decision analysis is an 
applied extension of decision theory applicable to one-of- 
a-kind major decisions*
The succeeding six sections of this paper siunmarise the 
essentials of the decision analysis technique developed
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for the Voyager Mars Project* The balance of this 
paper describes the results of selected decision.analysis
exercises and the conclusions that can be drawn from 
them,
Problem Structure
The initial step was to define those mission configuration 
candidates for each launch opportunity. After consider­ 
able elimination, the list was narrowed to 14 potential 
configurations, summarized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Potential Voyager Mars Mission 
Configurations
The proposed Mariner '71 configuration, I, e. two Mariner 
fly-by spacecraft, each with a small atmospheric probe, 
was included as an alternative for 1971 only, to evaluate 
the effect of the probe on the subsequent evolution of
Voyager capsule systems, .
In 1973, it was recognized that budgetary or develop­ 
mental restrictions might preclude capsules of any type 
for the first Voyager Mars orbiting mission* Accord­ 
ingly, three sans-capsule configurations were proposed,
two employing the Saturn IB and the third the Saturn V.
The next five configurations of Figure 1 were considered 
to be of primary interest. Each configuration consists 
of two planetary vehicles launched by a single Saturn V. 
Each planetary vehicle is comprised of an. orbiting space­ 
craft and, a capsule system, and, both capsules of a con­ 
figuration are assumed to be identical* The five alter­ 
natives differ only in their capsule systems, in that the 
capsules of each, alternative are one of the following:
a* Small atmospheric probes, similar to the probes
of Mariner '71.
b» Small probes with both atmospheric and descent
television capability*
e. Large landers with television and extensive
biological experiments (i.e., Voyager Biological 
Laboratories).
The first four mission configurations above were assumed 
to be available for each Mars opportunity from 1973 
through 1981. It was concluded that the development of 
the VBL configuration would preclude its availability until 
1975. The year 1981 was included as a Voyager Mars 
launch opportunity in the decision structure to evaluate 
the rationale for discontinuing Voyager Mars missions 
after the 1979 opportunity.
The next three configurations of Figure 1 are dual- 
capsule configurations; i.e., each spacecraft carries not
one but two capsules. The first capsules of both plane­ 
tary vehicles for each configuration are small atmo­ 
spheric probes which are released from, the vehicles 
prior to their insertion into orbit about the planet. The 
second capsules of both planetary vehicles enter after 
the vehicles have achieved Mars orbit and, depending 
upon the configuration,, are either atmospheric probes, 
descent television probes, or medium-sized, television 
landers,
Additionally, for all Mars opportunities from 1971 through 
1981, the decision model, is provided, the option, to skip 
the opportunity or to discontinue further Voyager mis­ 
sions to Mars at that point in the project profile.
The other major facet of the problem structure entailed a 
comprehensive definition of the possible outcomes of the 
Voyager Mars Project. As illustrated in. Figure 2, 56 
possible project outcomes were defined, consisting of all 
possible combinations of 4 outcomes from the orbiting 
spacecraft and. 14 outcomes from the capsule systems 
employed during the project.
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Figure 2, Prefect Outcomes
o. Medium-sized landers with, capability for landed. The four spacecraft outcomes range from our present
television and. rudimentary surface physical 
experiments*
large landers 'with television and extensive 
physical experiments.
level of spacecraft achievement with respect to the red 
planet (the Mariner IV fly-by^to long-term operation 
(approximately 6 months) of a Voyager spacecraft in 
orbit about the planet*
£2-2
The capsule outcomes can be classified as either entry 
and descent outcomes or landed outcomes. The 
principal achievements during entry and descent are the 
acquisition of atmospheric and descent television data. 
Landed outcomes are comprised of all combinations of 
three major achievements on the surface of the planet: 
television, physical experiments, and biological 
experiments.
Decision Structure
The implementation of decision analysis employs a 
decision tree, the principles of which are shown in 
Figure 3. The decision tree contains two types of nodes: 
decision nodes and chance nodes, and two types of 
branches: configuration branches and outcome branches. 
The full Voyager Mars decision tree contains some 3200 
nodes and 23, 000 branches.
CHANCE 
NODE
Figure 3. Decision Tree Principles
At each decision node, a choice exists among the mission 
configuration alternatives available for the launch 
opportunity in question; the branches following each 
decision node represent the available configurations. 
Associated with each configuration branch is a dollar cost 
of the selected mission configuration at that point in the 
project history.
Each chance node is followed by a set of outcome 
branches, one branch for each outcome that may be
achieved at that point in the project. Associated with
each outcome branch is a relative value of achieving the 
outcome and a probability that the configuration selected 
will, in fact, achieve the outcome,
To generate these three fundamental parameters:: 
a- Costs of potential mission configurations, 
fo» Values of project outcomes, and
c. Probabilities of mission configurations achieving
project outcomes,
three major models were developed. The essential
features of these models are summarized in the next 
three sections,.
The sequencing of configuration decisions and outcomes 
affects the decision tree structure* As illustrated to 
Table 1, the selection of the 1971 mission configuration 
is the first event of interest. Prior to obtaining the 
outcome from this mission., the 1973 configuration .must 
also be selected. Similarly, toe 1075 configuration must 
be chosen before the 1973 outcome, but after obtaining 
the results from, the 1971 mission* In general, a mission 
configuration must be selected in ignorance of the results 
of the previous mission,,, but with knowledge of the results 
of the mission prior to the previous one,
Cost Model
To generate the costs of the mission configuration. 
alternatives at each decision node in the tree structure, 
a comprehensive cost model was developed. The model 
entails estimating nominal or baseline costs for each of 
the 14 potential mission configurations and then modifying 
the baseline costs at each decision node .in accordance 
with the history of the project.
Baseline costs for the 14 potential mission configurations 
of Figure 1 were developed by first dividing each con­ 
figuration into the following six cost categories:
a. Launch, vehicle,
b. Spacecraft (less science).
YEAR
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1977 19W
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Table 1, Order of Events
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MISSION 
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0
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OPERATION
30
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30
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45
45
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5
0
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30
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30
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45
45
45
45
45
45
45
5
0
TOTAL 
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270
501
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678
783
855
1086
1305
1440
810
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1140
55
0
Table 2, Baseline Mission Configuration Costs
e. Capsule (less science).
d. Mission science,,
e. Mission integration and operations,
f. Project management.
Baseline spacecraft, capsule, and science costs were 
then estimated for each configuration using a reservoir 
of cost information. Baseline launch vehicle, integration
and operations and project management costs were 
estimated in a similar manner. Table 2 is a summary of 
the baseline costs for the mission configurations of 
Figure 1.
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Table 3, Representative Mission Configuration Costs
At each decision node, the baseline costs of Table 2 are 
modified for that opportunity according to the:
a. Mission configuration developed for the previous 
launch opportunity.
b. Most recent spacecraft and capsule outcomes 
achieved.
c. Year of opportunity.
In total, some 2500 modified configuration costs are 
required by the decision model. Table 3 illustrates six 
such configuration costs arranged to form a typical 
project profile. Note, for example, that the cost of the 
physical laboratory configuration in 1975 is substantially 
less than the baseline $1305 million of Table 2, due 
principally to prior spacecraft and capsule development 
history.
The project profile of Table 3 is similar to a project 
sequence previously considered by NASA for the Voyager
Mars Project, and the cost model results correlate 
closely with known budgetary estimates for that project 
sequence.
Value Model
To encode the subjective value preferences of the decision
maker and convert these preferences into relative values 
of orbiter and capsule outcomes, a value model, was 
developed.
Input to the value model employs a value tree, shown in 
abridged form in Figure 4, The total value of the 
Voyager Mars Project, normalized to 100 percent, is
first divided among three major components: scientific, 
technological, and political value. Each of these 
components is., in turn, divided Into subcomponents, e»g» t
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100%
40%
25%
Figure 4. Typical Value Model Input
science into biological, planetological, meteorological, 
and interplanetary science.
The numbers on the value tree of Figure 4 are a set of 
representative, or "nominal" values assigned for the 
purpose of exercising the decision model, and no JPL or 
NASA endorsement of these values is intended to be 
conveyed. With these nominal values, for example, the 
value of biological science is 50% x 50% = 25% of the total 
value of the proj ect.
At the tip of each value component on the tree, the 
contribution of each of the 4 orbiter outcomes and 14 
capsule outcomes toward achieving the value objective 
represented by that tip is assessed. This is suggested in 
Figure 4 for the component of biological science, where 5 
percent of biological science value can be achieved by the 
orbiting spacecraft and 95 percent by the capsule system. 
The percentage breakdown among the various outcomes 
is not shown in the interest of brevity.
To arrive at the value of a particular spacecraft or 
capsule outcome, the logic of the value model is simply 
to sum the values of the value tree terminal nodes 
corresponding to that outcome. For the nominal values 
of Figure 4, the results of such a summation for all 
outcomes are tabulated in Table 4. It is interesting to 
note that over 30 percent of the project value can be 
achieved by the orbiting spacecraft, suggesting that the 
spacecraft is indeed more than just a bus to carry the 
capsule to the planet. Of the capsule value, nearly 90 
percent of it accrues from landed outcomes, with 
emphasis on surface television and biological 
experiments.
Probability Model
The most comprehensive and complex of the three 
models, the probability model generates, for each 
chance node in the decision tree, the probabilities of 
the selected mission configuration achieving the various 
project outcomes. Some 5200 different probabilities are 
required by the full Voyager decision tree.
Input data to the probability model consists of both 
hardware operating reliabilities and probabilities that 
the environmental range over which the hardware is 
designed to operate contains the actual environment to 
be encountered. The soft-landing environment, i,e,,
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Table 4. Typical Value Model Eesults
knowledge of landing site surface features, is a prime
example of an environmental probability.,
The hardware operating reliabilities are probabilistically 
combined to arrive at the probabilities of accomplishing 
major phases of the mission profile, shown in functional 
flow format in .Figure 5. .In turn, the mission phase 
probabilities are appropriately combined with the 
environmental confidences to yield, the probabilities of 
achieving the project outcomes. This procedure is 
performed for each mission configuration, in each year 
of opportunity, and at each current project outcome level 
as required by the decision tree structure. Provision is 
included to vary configuration hardware reliabilities and 
environmental probabilities as a function of the year of 
opportunity and the most recently achieved spacecraft 
and capsule outcome levels,
For a set of nominal reliability and confidence data, 
Table 5 illustrates the output of the probability model for
MISS ION CONFIGURATION: 
MISSION:
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1ELEV IS INLANDERS
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Figure 5. Mission Functional Flow Diagram
the television lander configuration (see Figure 1) 
launched in 1973, ft can be seen that, for example, given 
that a planetary vehicle has been successfully put into 
orbit about the planet, the probability of both long-term 
orbiter operation and landed television return from the 
capsule is high. The high probability of remaining at the 
baseline project outcome level is due principally to the 
reliability of the Saturn V, which was taken as 0.8 in the 
nominal data set.
Computer Program System
To construct the decision model and perform selected 
decision analyses, a versatile program system called 
SPAN (Space Programs ANalysis) was developed. The 
computer programs of the SPAN system are written in 
FORTRAN IV and designed to operate on the GE 635 
system.
"TIME
Figure 6. The SPAN System
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The SPAN system operates in four serial phases, shown 
in Figure 6. In Phase 1, the decision tree is constructed 
from user specifications, thereby obviating description 
of the entire tree (3200 nodes, 23, 000 branches) to the 
computer. In Phase 2, the three major models—cost, 
value, and probability—are run as described in the 
preceding three sections with user specified input data. 
Phase 3 consists of merging the cost, value, and 
probability model results with the decision tree, i. e., 
relating each configuration branch with its appropriate 
cost and each outcome branch with its appropriate value 
and probability. The output of Phase 3 is called the 
decision model. Phase 4 then consists of selectively 
analyzing the model according to user instructions.
In the following six sections are presented the highlights 
of numerous nominal and sensitivity analyses of the 
Voyager Mars Project decision model.
Analysis with Nominal Data
To provide a basis for subsequent reference, the initial 
decision analysis was performed with a set of nominal 
cost, value, and probability data, as described in 
preceding sections.
The principal result of a decision analysis is a description 
of the dominant policies of the project. A policy is a 
setting of each decision node in the decision tree; i. e., it 
is a complete strategy for selecting configurations at 
each mission opportunity in light of the history of the 
project to that date. With each policy there is associated 
an expected value and an expected cost; nine hypothetical 
policies are suggested in Figure 7.
Policies A, B, C, and D of Figure 7 are dominant policies. 
A policy is dominant if (1) it has a higher expected value 
than all other policies of lower or equal expected cost and 
(2) the marginal return (A expected value/A expected 
cost) in proceeding to any policy of higher expected cost 
is always less than the marginal return from any policy 
of lower expected cost. The locus of dominant policies 
is sometimes called the convex outer hull of policies. 
Note that policy E fulfills the first criterion but not the 
second; its inclusion in the locus of dominant policies 
would destroy the convex nature of the locus.
For the nominal costs, values, and probabilities of the 
reference analysis, some 35 policies were found to be 
dominant. Table 6 is a tabulation of the expected value
and cost of these policies, and Figure 8 is the resulting 
plot.
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Figure 7. Dominant Policies Table 6, Dominant Policies: Reference Analysis
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At the upper end of the spectrum is the maximum value 
policy. It consists of flying the most ambitious con­ 
figuration available at each launch opportunity, viz., 
Mariner '71, physical laboratories in 1973, and biological 
laboratories at each opportunity from 1973 through 1981. 
For nominal input data, this policy has an expected value 
of 56.6 percent and an expected cost of $5.168 billion 
(including the '71 and '81 missions).
At the other extreme of the dominant policy spectrum is 
the minimum cost policy. It consists of doing nothing. 
It costs nothing and is worth nothing.
Policy 22 is representative of the type of strategy of the 
33 intermediate policies. It has an expected value of 
47.4 percent and an expected cost of $3.482 billion and 
requires the following sequential strategy:
a. 1971: Skip opportunity
b. 1973: Dual atmospheric probes/television landers
c. 1 97 5 : Biological laboratories
d. 1977:
1. Discontinue project if 1973 configuration 
achieves long-term orbital operation and 
capsule descent television or soft landing.
2. Discontinue project if 1973 configuration 
achieves short-term orbital operation and 
capsule landed television.
3. Otherwise.,, biological laboratories.
e, 1979:
1. Discontinue project if outcome after 1975 
mission is long-term orbital operation and 
capsule soft landing or better,
2. Discontinue project if outcome after 1975 is 
short-term orbital 'Operation and capsule 
landed television with or without biological 
experiments,
3. iSMp opportunity if outcome after 1975 is 
short-term orbital operation and capsule 
surface biological experiments alone.
4. Otherwise, biological laboratories. 
f. 1981:
1. Physical laboratories, if 1979 is skipped, 
and 1977 configuration does not improve the 
1975 outcome.
2. Biological laboratories, if outcome after 
1977 is short-term orbital operation and
capsule soft landing alone,
3. Biological laboratories, if capsule soft 
landing has not yet been achieved.
4. Otherwise, discontinue project.
The policies of the reference decision analysis can be 
grouped into policy sets. The policies within a policy set 
contain essentially the same configuration alternatives at 
each launch opportunity, although the conditions for 
selecting the alternatives are different. For example, 
policy 23 is identical to policy 22, except that the criteria 
for continuing the project in 1977 and 1981 are slightly 
more liberal—hence the slight increase in expected cost 
($40 million) and value (0. 3 percent). By employing 
judgment where necessary, the 35 policies of the reference 
analysis can be grouped into 9 policy sets, which are 
summarized in Table 7.
Sensitivity to Time
To evaluate the sensitivity of the dominant policy sets to 
time, the nominal costs, values, and probabilities were 
monotonically varied versus time as follows:
a. To reflect the present worth of future expendi­ 
tures, costs were decreased by annual discount 
factors.
b. To reflect the preference for early return of 
project value, values were also decreased by 
annual discount factors.
c. To reflect advancements in the state of the 
engineering art, hardware reliabilities were 
exponentially increased with time.
The effect of holding costs and values at nominal and 
increasing probabilities versus time is to bias the dominant 
policy preference toward later missions when the 
probabilities are more favorable. For example, the 
third policy in the resulting convex outer hull consists of 
skipping the first five opportunities and launching biological 
laboratories in 1981.
Discounting values has the opposite effect of preferring 
earlier missions. At value discount factors of 10 percent 
per annum and with time-dependent probabilities, the 
value preference outweighs the probability preference, and 
only three dominant policy sets result. Between the 
extremes of the maximum value policy and the minimum 
cost policy is a strategy similar to the maximum value 
profile, except that television landers may be flown in 
1973, and the project may be discontinued as early as the 
1977 opportunity, given a sufficiently high level of success.
At a value discount factor of 5 percent per annum, the 
value and probability preferences tend to neutralize one 
another, and the dominant policy sets are not grossly 
different from those of the reference analysis. Nine 
policy sets result, five of which (A, B, F, H, and I) 
resemble the reference sets of Table 7. The remaining 
higher cost strategies favor early atmospheric probes, 
either via Mariner '71 or by skipping 1971 and sending the 
dual probeAanders in 1973. The other lower cost 
strategies favor SIB orbiters in 1973.
Discounting costs tends to swing the scale in the same
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POLICY 
SET
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
1
POLICY 
NO.
1
2
3
4-9
10-19
20-30
31-32
33-34
35
EXPECTED 
VALUE 
(PERCENT)
0
14
20
35-39
41-43
47-52
54
56
57
EXPECTED 
COST 
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
0
0.7
LI
2.2 TO 2.6
2.7 TO 3.0
3.4 TO 42
46
49
5,2
1971
DISCONTINUE
SKIP
SKIP
SKIP
SKIP
SKIP
SKIP
MARINER'71
MARINER'71
1973
—
SIB ORBITERS
SIBORBITERS
SKIP
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS
PHYSICAL 
LABS
PHYSICAL 
LABS
1975
—
DISCONTINUE
SKIP
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS
TELEVISION 
LANDERS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
1977
...
—
PHYSICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
TELEVISION 
LANDERS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
TELEVISION 
LANDERS OR 
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
1979
—
...
PHYSICAL 
LABS
TELEVISION 
LANDERS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
TELEVISION 
LANDERS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
1981
...
...
PHYSICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
TELEVISION 
LANDERS OR 
PHYSICAL LABS 
OR DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
TELEVISION 
LANDERS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
PHYSICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
Table 7. Dominant Policy Sets: Reference Analysis
POLICY 
SET
A
B
J
(NEW)
F 
(MODIFIED)
K
(NEW)
H 
(MODIFIED)
1
1971
DISCONTINUE
SKIP
SKIP
SKIP
MARINER'71
MARINER'71
MARINER'71
1973
—
SIBORBITERS
SIBORBITERS
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS
TELEVISION 
LANDERS
PHYSICAL 
LABS
PHYSICAL 
LABS
1975
—
DISCONTINUE
DUAL PROBE/ 
LANDERS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
1977
—
—
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIP OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
1979
—
—
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIPOR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
PHYSICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIPOR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
SKIPOR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
1981
—
—
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
PHYSICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
PHYSICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS OR 
DISCONTINUE
BIOLOGICAL 
LABS
Table 8. Composite of Dominant Policy Sets: Time Sensitivity Analyses
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direction as does increasing probabilities, since deferred 
costs are to be preferred over current costs. With 
increasing probabilities and equal value and cost discount 
factors of 20 percent per annum, for example, policy sets 
A, B, F, and I of the reference analysis are still dominant. 
Two of the three remaining policy sets start with bypassing 
the 1971 opportunity and employing SIB orbiters in 1973.
In summary, Table 8 is a composite of the dominant 
policy sets which appear frequently as costs, values, and 
probabilities are varied with time. To qualify for the 
composite list, a policy set either dominates in more than 
one of the time sensitivity analyses or contains more than 
one discrete policy.
Sensitivity.to Value Assignments
Several decision model analyses were performed with 
extreme value assignments to examine the sensitivity of 
the dominant policy sets to different decision maker value 
preferences. Costs and probabilities were held at their 
nominal values.
For example, when all the project value is placed in the 
biological science category of Figure 4, biological 
laboratories are flown at the earliest possible opportunity 
(1975) in every dominant policy set. In contrast, physical 
laboratories and orbiters alone do not appear in any 
dominant project profile.
Placing all the value emphasis on Voyager as a medium 
for obtaining the know-how for manned exploration of 
Mars shifts the project favor to television laiiders, 
physical laboratories and biological laboratories *
Orbiters alone are de-emphasized.
All the value emphasis on world opinion results in only a 
slight shift away from the policy sets of Tables 7 and 8. 
The noticeable difference is that television landers appear 
more frequently, at the expense of both physical and 
biological laboratories.
Sensitivity to Knowledge of Mars Environment
In the nominal probability data set, the probability that 
the range of entry environment for which the capsule is 
designed contains the actual environment which it will 
encounter is taken as 0. 9. Given successful capsule 
entry, this value is set to unity for the rest of the 
project. If this entry environment confidence factor is 
set to unity at the start, implying sufficient initial know­ 
ledge of the Mars atmosphere for entry capsule design, 
then all configurations employing probes of any sort 
disappear from the preferred policies, with the exception 
of Mariner !71 with its atmospheric probe, which appears 
in the maximum value policy and again in an extremely 
low cost policy.
Nominally, the probability that the capsule system will 
attempt a soft landing at a site with physical character­ 
istics within its design capability is taken as 0.75. This 
figure may be improved by several accomplishments, 
including orbital observation of the landing site, descent 
television, and, of course, a successful soft landing. 
Setting this factor to 1.0 at the start virtually eliminates
the environmental risk of soft landing, and the resulting 
profiles reflect this increased confidence by selecting 
biological and physical laboratories for initial landing 
attempts in lieu of the less costly television landers.
Sensitivity to Risk Aversion
All the analyses described thus far have employed 
expected value decision making. At each decision node 
in the decision tree, the net expected (mean) value of 
each alternative is calculated, and the alternative of 
highest net expected value is selected. Decision making 
on the basis of expected value implies that the decision 
maker is neither a risk-taker nor a risk-averter.
In reality, however, most decision makers possess an 
inherent aversion to risk to some degree. Suppose, for 
example, your employer is willing to flip a coin, double 
or nothing, for your next year T s salary. How much would 
he have to pay you to accept this proposition? The 
expected value of this lottery is exactly next year ! s salary 
(0. 5 x nothing + 0. 5 x twice next year ! s salary), but only 
a rare individual would play this game without some side 
payment. The amount of the side payment required 
determines the degree of risk aversion.
Limited analyses were performed introducing risk 
aversion characteristics at each decision node. The 
computer program for risk aversion analysis is not 
implemented to search out automatically the convex outer 
hull of policies. Rather, the program, in effect, 
determines the policy of maximum expected value for a 
given maximum expected project cost (and a specified 
risk aversion characteristic). There is no guarantee that 
the resulting policy is a member of the outer hull, but by 
extracting several such policies over a range of expected 
cost, those policies which are obviously not dominant can 
be identified and discarded.
At one extreme, if the decision maker fs aversion to risk 
is sufficiently high, the locus of dominant policies shrinks 
to a single point: the minimum cost policy A of Table 6 
and Figure 8. At the other extreme of no risk aversion, 
by definition, all of the dominant policies of Table 6 and 
Figure 8 result.
If the risk aversion characteristic is relaxed slightly 
from its upper extreme to what might be called heavy 
risk aversion, ultra-conservative policies dominate. The 
progression in configuration sophistication from mission 
to mission is gradual and markedly dependent upon prior 
mission accomplishments. Mariner is generally selected 
for the 1971 opportunity, and Saturn IB orbiters for the 
1973 mission. Atmospheric or television probes are the 
choice for 1975, in either the single- or dual-capsule 
configurations, depending on the outcome of Mariner '71. 
Depending on the accomplishments of the 1973 orbiters, 
television landers, dual atmospheric probes/television 
landers, or project discontinuance are selected in 1977. 
For the 1979 and 1981 opportunities, either television 
landers or termination are selected. Physical and biological 
laboratories are noticeably absent from the profiles.
If risk aversion is relaxed from heavy to slight risk aver­ 
sion, the use of probes alone with the Voyager orbiter dis­ 
appears from the dominant policies. The 1971 opportunity
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is generally skipped, except for the higher cost policies. 
For 1973, dual probes/television landers are selected for 
policies in the midrange of cost, physical laboratories 
prevail at higher costs and SIB orbiters at lower costs. 
Television landers and biological and physical laboratories 
are used frequently for 1975 and beyond.
Redundant Saturn V Launch Vehicles
Given that two planetary vehicles, orbiter plus capsule(s), 
will be launched at each Voyager Mars opportunity, should 
both of them be launched on a single Saturn V, or should 
two Saturn V T s (each with a single planetary vehicle) be 
employed? The analyses of the preceding sections 
assumed a single Saturn V. To answer this question, a 
parallel set of analyses was performed with the number of 
Saturn V T s in the Voyager/Saturn V configurations of 
Figure 1 changed from one to two per opportunity. Chiefly 
affected were the cost and probability models.
Figure 9 is a plot of both loci of dominant policies for 
projects employing exclusively either one or two Saturn 
V*s per opportunity. Nominal costs, values, and 
probabilities have been used, except that the reliability of 
the Saturn V from launch through SIVB interplanetary 
injection has been increased from its nominal value of 0. 8 
to 1.0. Since the launch vehicle is assumed to be per­ 
fectly reliable, the addition of a second, redundant Saturn 
V at each opportunity only increases the cost of the project
and not its expected value. Thus, the curve describing 
one Saturn V per opportunity dominates two per 
opportunity for all policies.
70%
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EXPECTED 
PROJECT 
VALUE 40%
20%
10%
ONE S? PER - 
OPPORTUNITY
TWO SS'S PER 
OPPORTUNITY
SEREL(ABILITY - LO
0 LO 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 
EXPECTED PROJECT COST ($ IN BILLIONS)
Figure 10. Saturn V Redundancy
return to justify using two Saturn V T s per opportunity, 
regardless of the strategy being followed. Since current 
estimates of the Saturn V reliability for Voyager range 
from about 0. 8 to 0. 9, it would appear that one Saturn V 
should be used instead of two for each opportunity of the 
Voyager Mars Project. This does not preclude, however, 
the possibility that a mixed strategy, employing one 
Saturn V for some missions of the project and two for 
others, might be even more superior than the one Saturn 
V strategy.
Conclusions
0 1.0 2.0 3.0 40 5.0 
EXPECTED PROJECT COST ($ IN BILLIONS)
Figure 9. Saturn V Redundancy
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Except where noted, the following conclusions are based 
on the range of allowable mission configurations of 
Figure 1, on nominal costs, values, and probabilities, 
and on reasonable ranges of time preference and risk 
aversion. It is emphasized that these conclusions are the 
result of a study, and in no way constitute a decision by 
NASA, JPL, or any government agency regarding the 
Voyager Project.
Maximum return of expected value is obtained by the 
following project strategy:
1971: Mariner !71.
1973: Physical laboratories.
1975-1981: Biological laboratories.
On the other hand, Figure 10 describes the same situation 
when the Saturn V reliability is reduced to 0.7. Now, at 
the higher cost policies, the increment in expected 
benefit from the redundant Saturn V outweighs the 
increment in cost, and two Saturn V's per opportunity are 
to be preferred—if policies of near maximum value are 
being followed.
It was shown that at a Saturn V reliability of approximately 
0.77, the curve describing one Saturn V per opportunity 
becomes dominant over the entire range of policies. In 
other words, for nominal input parameters of cost, value, 
and probability, if the reliability of the Saturn V is 
greater than about 0.77, there is not sufficient marginal
This policy returns over 69 percent* of expected value at 
an expected cost of about $5.1 billion. *
Flying television landers in 1973 in place of the physical 
laboratories is almost as good a policy. Expected value 
is reduced by only a few tenths of a percent and expected 
cost by about $0.1 billion.
*Adjusted to include increasing hardware reliabilities 
versus time, to reflect advancements in the state of the 
engineering art.
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If no Mariner is flown in 1971, a good strategy is to fly Acknowledgements
dual-capsule planetary vehicles in 1973. viz., small,
direct-entry, atmospheric probes and medium-sized, The contributions of many individuals have been drawn
orbital-entry, television landers. The expected value and from liberally in preparing this paper. Special acknowl-
cost of such a project are approximately 68 percent and edgement is given Dr. J. R. Matheson, Mr. A. B.
$4. 8 billion, respectively., Pollard, and Mr. N. Ward of Stanford Research Institute;
Mr. J. H. Chestek, Mr. E. L. Berger, and Miss M. B.
Terminating the project after the 1979 mission, the 1977 Reynolds of General Electric; and Mr. L. D. Stimpson of 
mission, or even the 1975 mission, given that a sufficiently the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for their contributions. 
high return of project value has been realized, can 
generally reduce the expected cost of the project by twice 
as much as the reduction in expected value. Typical 
figures are a 22 percent reduction in expected cost and an 
11 percent reduction in expected value.
A good austerity program is the following:
1971; Skip
1973; Orbiters only
1975; Dual probes/television landers
1977-1981; Biological laboratories, or skip, or 
discontinue
This program can be performed for under $3, 0 billion and 
can be expected to return over 40 percent of total value,
Unless the decision maker is highly averse to risk, the
use of small, nonstirvivable probes alone with the 
Voyager spacecraft and Saturn V launch vehicle is not 
recommended. If probes are to be flown, they should be 
..flown on the smaller Mariner spacecraft or in dual- 
capsule configurations with survivable landers*
Finally, for current' estimates of Saturn V reliability, a 
project profile employing one Saturn V at each opportunity
is preferable to two per opportunity.
The principal product of this effort lies in the development 
of a logical procedure for selecting project strategy which 
reflects technical feasibility, NASA project objectives, 
and the economic environment of the project. Full 
appreciation of the results of the decision model requires 
more insight into the model structure than is given in this 
paper.
It is emphasized that this tool is adaptive to continuing 
decision analysis as new, attractive project alternatives 
arise* or as more current data becomes available., To 
realize its full potential! it should be used in such a 
dynamic mode» with frequent interact!on, with responsible 
NASA decision, makers,,
Tor examplei as this paper goes to press, the Titan'EH.
family of launch vehicles is being considered for early 
Voyager Mars missions.
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